



**BRAVE
NEW
WORK**

KEY ISSUES SERIES 2020

THE FUTURE IS NOW: CREATING DECENT WORK POST-PANDEMIC

SUNIL JOHAL

JUNE, 2020



ABOUT PPF

Good Policy. Better Canada. The Public Policy Forum builds bridges among diverse participants in the policy-making process and gives them a platform to examine issues, offer new perspectives and feed fresh ideas into critical policy discussions. We believe good policy is critical to making a better Canada—a country that's cohesive, prosperous and secure. We contribute by:

- Conducting research on critical issues
- Convening candid dialogues on research subjects
- Recognizing exceptional leaders

Our approach—called **Inclusion to Conclusion**—brings emerging and established voices to policy conversations, which informs conclusions that identify obstacles to success and pathways forward. PPF is an independent, non-partisan charity whose members are a diverse group of private, public and non-profit organizations.



© 2019, Public Policy Forum
1400 - 130 Albert Street
Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1P 5G4
613.238.7858

ISBN: 978-1-77452-009-3

WITH THANKS TO OUR LEAD SPONSOR



**TD READY
COMMITMENT**

WITH THANKS TO OUR SUPPORTING SPONSORS



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary.....	6
The Future of Work is Now	7
State of Play: Canada's Labour Market and Economy.....	8
Income Inequality	8
Increases in Non-Standard and Precarious Work.....	10
Declining Unionization Rates	11
Wage Stagnation.....	12
Financial Security	13
Digitization of the Economy	13
How does Canada's social architecture hold up?	14
Trends Accelerating the Future of Work.....	17
More unbundled and online work.....	17
Deglobalization and reshoring	18
Increased corporate concentration and digitization	19
Disproportionate impacts, worsening income inequality and poverty.....	20
Fiscal consolidation agenda in the medium term.....	22
Policy Options to Drive Decent Work.....	24
Market-shaping approaches.....	24
System resilience	26
Modernizing policy frameworks.....	28
Conclusion	35

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



SUNIL JOHAL

Fellow, Public Policy Forum

Sunil serves as a Fellow to the Public Policy Forum and the Brookfield Institute. From 2012 to 2019 he was Policy Director at the University of Toronto's Mowat Centre. In 2019, he was named Chair of the Expert Panel on Modern Labour Standards by the federal Minister of Labour. He has contributed expert commentary and advice to organizations and media outlets such as the G-20, World Economic Forum, Brookings Institution, Globe and Mail, Washington Post, Guardian and OECD. He holds degrees from LSE, Osgoode Hall Law School and the University of Western Ontario.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Income inequality, precarious work and the digitization of the economy are now issues that policymakers must grapple with immediately, or risk economic ruin and social upheaval.

The future of work has been a popular topic among policymakers, the media and commentators in recent years. Artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, the sharing economy and other emerging technologies were expected to upend the nature of how people work, eliminate an array of routine and repetitive tasks, and put pressure on social support frameworks designed for a different era. These impacts were expected to be felt in the near to medium term, but with enough lead time to prepare workers and adapt policies for the advent of the gig economy and an increasingly digital world.

Suddenly, the future of work is already here. The need to reinvent our social and economic policy frameworks has a newfound urgency.

The COVID-19 pandemic, which swept across the globe in the early months of 2020, has rapidly accelerated long-standing trends in labour markets and economies around the world. Income inequality, precarious work and the digitization of the economy are now issues that policymakers must grapple with immediately, or risk economic ruin and social upheaval.

Looking ahead to a post-pandemic world, one can easily imagine a sustained period of economic anxiety. Economies may open and shutter again periodically as the virus returns in subsequent waves. A handful of cash-rich multinational digital giants squeezing ever less competitive industries will rule the day. Under this scenario, part-time, temporary and contingent workers will likely become the staffing option of choice for firms that are ruthlessly focused on profits and minimizing long-term commitments to their workforces in a highly uncertain environment.

How can Canada prepare for the future of work in a way that protects and supports those who will suffer most as a result of the pandemic? Young people, workers in the service and hospitality sectors, women, historically marginalized groups and older workers are all likely to face a steeper uphill climb in the years ahead. How can we ensure that the quality of jobs in Canada meets the needs of workers, by providing a fair income, security and opportunities for advancement?

This paper reviews the current state of Canada's labour market, explores key trends related to the nature and quality of work, and considers which trends might accelerate or change course post-pandemic. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations charting a course toward a more inclusive and resilient Canadian economy that prioritizes decent work.

THE FUTURE OF WORK IS NOW

The future of work is upon us. Policymakers had been actively engaged in conversations about the topic for a number of years, but, as is often the case, things happened much more quickly and for different reasons than anticipated. Rather than artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics disrupting us, a virus has suddenly upended what we understood about how we live, work and move forward.

The COVID-19 pandemic has starkly revealed some of the cleavages and challenges we face as a society. It has also raised immediate, pressing questions about how these problems can best be addressed to foster an economy and labour market that work for the benefit of all Canadians.

Precarious and low-wage workers such as delivery drivers, long-term care workers and grocery store cashiers were pushed into the spotlight as “normal” life ground to a halt. The shift to digital is happening at warp speed, whether for buying groceries or conducting work and social interactions. The international order appears set to further unravel as the connective tissue of travel and trade frays. The economic downturn is already disproportionately affecting women, younger Canadians and low-wage workers.

What is Decent Work?

According to the International Labour Organization, decent work “sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.”

Source: <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm>

What does it all mean for the future of work? How can we emerge from the pandemic in better shape than we entered by generating quality jobs for Canadians? This paper will explore these questions by looking at three topics:

1. The state of Canada’s labour market, economy and social architecture before the pandemic.
2. Work-related trends and issues the pandemic may accelerate, or reverse, particularly with regard to decent work.
3. Some potential policy solutions that can position Canada for success, in the areas of market-shaping approaches, system resilience and policy framework renewal.


STATE OF PLAY: CANADA'S LABOUR MARKET AND ECONOMY

Entering the pandemic, Canadian workers and employers faced major challenges related to income inequality, precarious work, declining unionization rates, wage stagnation, financial security and digitization of the economy. Appreciating some of the facts and nuances around these subjects helps to deepen an understanding of the nature and quality of work in Canada, how it has changed over time and is likely to evolve in the future.

INCOME INEQUALITY

- Income inequality in Canada has hit a plateau at or near record highs over the past two decades, as measured by the Gini coefficient.¹


Inequality, Measured by the Gini Coefficient, Adjusted for Household Size, Three Measures of Income | Canada, 1976-2018



Source: Statistics Canada, Table: 11-10-0134-01.

- After-tax income inequality (comparing the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile) among non-senior households doubled between 1976 and 2015.²


After-Tax Income Polarization (P90:P10 Ratio), Canada and Ontario, Non-Seniors, 1976-2015



Source: Statistics Canada, Custom Tabulation from Canada Income Survey

- Between 1982 and 2014, the market income of the bottom 50% of earners fell by 28.4%, while the top 1% experienced a 52.6% gain and the top 0.01% saw a 133.3% increase.³
- The market income share of the top 1% in Canada increased from 7.6% in 1982 to 11.6% in 2014, peaking during that period at 13.6% in 2006.⁴
- The top 1% of earners in Canada accounted for 37% of total income growth between 1981 and 2010, second only to the United States among countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).⁵
- In the wake of the 2008-09 recession, the bottom 10% of non-senior earners saw the greatest decrease in income, falling from about \$9,500 to \$7,500 between 2008 and 2015.⁶
- In the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, significant increases in market income inequality can be observed (mitigated by the impacts of the tax and transfer system).⁷ There's other compelling evidence that vulnerable groups are at greater risk during economic downturns.⁸


INCREASES IN NON-STANDARD AND PRECARIOUS WORK



Employment and Social Development Canada. (2019). Report of the expert panel on modern federal labour standards. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/expert-panel-final/expert-panel-final-report-20190826.pdf>

- Increases in non-standard forms of employment (e.g., self-employed, temporary, contract and part-time workers) have accounted for 60% of job growth in OECD countries since the mid-1990s.⁹
- Non-standard employment accounts for roughly one-third of all employment in Canada.^{10,11,12}
- For the first time on record, fewer than half of jobs in Canada were full-time and full-year positions, according to the 2016 census.¹³
- Part-time workers as a proportion of the Canadian workforce have increased from 12.5% in 1976 to 18.9% in 2019.¹⁴
- Women, people with disabilities, visible minorities, recent immigrants, temporary foreign workers, workers with less education and single parents are more likely to be employed in precarious forms of work (e.g., involving uncertainty, low income and limited social benefits).^{15,16,17,18}
- Fewer than a quarter of workers in Ontario engaged in non-standard forms of work had access to extended health, dental and insurance benefits in 2011, compared with more than 75% of workers in standard employment relationships. Fewer than 17% of workers engaged in non-standard work had access to an employer pension plan, compared with more than half of workers engaged in standard employment.¹⁹


DECLINING UNIONIZATION RATES



Statistics Canada, (2020). Table 14-10-0132-01. Union Status by Industry. Government of Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410013201>


- A number of factors underlie the decline in unionization rates, including structural changes in the Canadian economy (e.g., declining employment in traditionally highly unionized sectors such as mining and manufacturing).²⁰
- Other factors driving lower unionization rates include legislative changes (such as shifts toward mandatory votes for certification), less interest among workers in joining unions and employer resistance.^{21,22}
- The difference in wages between unionized and non-unionized workers dropped markedly from 20% in the 1980s to 8% by 2002, accounting for differences in occupation, age and education.²³

WAGE STAGNATION




- Overall median Canadian household income sat at \$61,400 in 2018, up only 15% in 42 years from \$53,400 in 1976 (in 2018 constant dollars), despite significant increases in women's labour force participation over the same period. This means many households now rely on two people to earn about as much as one could earn in previous generations.²⁴
- If real wages had risen in line with productivity between 1991 and 2005, Canadian workers would have received an average of an additional \$200 on their weekly paycheques.²⁵
- Between 1997 and 2016 in Ontario, real hourly wages for lower-skilled jobs plateaued, while those in higher-skilled categories, such as management and professional occupations, saw significant increases.²⁶

Ontario Real Hourly Wages, by Skill Level, 1997 and 2016 (constant 2016 dollars)



Source: Ontario Ministry of Finance, <https://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/economy/ltr/2017/ch3.html>




TD Bank Group (2017)³⁰

FINANCIAL SECURITY

- According to a 2019 survey, 48% of Canadians reported being \$200 or less away each month from financial insolvency, and 26% said they had no funds left over at the end of the month.²⁷
- Canadian household debt stood at 177% of disposable income in 2019, up 9% from 2018. One in four Canadians reported borrowing money to pay for food or other daily expenses.²⁸
- Income volatility is reported at higher rates by women, younger Canadians, those in modest-income households and social assistance recipients.²⁹

DIGITIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

- Digitization is expected to have wide-ranging impacts on all sectors of the economy, although productivity gains to date stemming from digitization have been marginal.³¹
- A handful of firms have quickly achieved significant scale in particular sectors. For example, Facebook and Google accounted for 74% of online digital advertising sales in Canada in 2017.³²
- Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics are anticipated to have significant impacts on jobs across the globe, by supplementing and augmenting workers' tasks or replacing occupations entirely. The scale and speed of these changes have attracted a wide range of studies with differing findings.³³



Statistics Canada. (2019). Measuring digital economic activities in Canada, 2010 to 2017. Statistics Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190503/dq190503a-eng.htm>

HOW DOES CANADA'S SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE HOLD UP?

Close to a quarter (23%) of Canadians under 30 spend more than half their income on rent.


FCM, 2019

Against this broader economic backdrop, gaps in Canada's overall social safety net have emerged in recent decades as work becomes increasingly precarious, wages stagnate and Canadians stretch their budgets to meet essential needs. There's no shortage of literature on the need to modernize policy frameworks designed in the 1940s, '50s and '60s in line with the realities of work in the 21st century. Areas ready for an update range from employment insurance and social assistance to skills training, childcare, retirement supports, labour standards and medicare.³⁴

A few examples of the notable shortfalls in policy frameworks designed to support Canadians in, entering or exiting the world of work include:

- The share of unemployed workers receiving employment insurance (EI) benefits exceeded 80% in the early 1990s, a figure that has dropped by half to about 40% in recent years.³⁵

- According to a 2019 survey, 9% of parents of children under five reported changing their work schedule due to difficulty finding childcare, while 7% had to work fewer hours and 6% delayed their return to work.³⁶
- The economic costs of mental illness in Canada are estimated to exceed \$50 billion a year in health care, productivity and quality of life costs, while one-third of adults with a mental health care need in the previous year reported their needs weren't fully met.³⁷
- In 2016, 19% of Canadians reported lacking insurance that covered all or part of their prescription costs.³⁸
- Close to a quarter (23%) of Canadians under 30 spend more than half their income on rent.³⁹
- More than half of Canadians (56%) over 50 do not have a retirement savings plan.⁴⁰



Macdonald, D., Friendly, F., (2020). In progress: Child Care Fees in Canada 2019. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2020/03/In%20progress_Child%20care%20fees%20in%20Canada%20in%202019_march12.pdf

These issues have all received attention in recent years from government-commissioned studies, think tank and academic reports, and stakeholder advocacy campaigns. Incremental progress has been made to address deficiencies in some cases, such as enhancements to the Canada Pension Plan or increased investments in affordable housing. For the most part, however, the needs of many Canadians outstrip the capacity of the supports and programs available to them.

Now, faced with a once in a century economic downturn that has impacted virtually all Canadians in some way, it will be much harder to ignore these gaps in key policy areas. Access to childcare challenges for some becomes a universal issue when schools and daycares shut, leaving working parents to take on new roles as teachers and care providers. Retirement savings and rent or mortgage payments assume a new urgency when a third of the labour force has applied for emergency income supports within weeks.

These challenges existed before the pandemic and will persist after it. But to what extent are they likely to accelerate or, perhaps, change course in the coming years as a result of how work has been impacted by COVID-19?

TRENDS ACCELERATING THE FUTURE OF WORK

One analyst predicts that over 25% of workers will keep working remotely post-pandemic, compared with fewer than 4% who worked from home before the crisis.

Fremson, 2020.

What work-related trends have emerged, or accelerated, during the pandemic that can be expected to persist over time? While this is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty, five trends do seem likely to dramatically alter the landscape of work in Canada, and elsewhere, in the coming years.

MORE UNBUNDLED AND ONLINE WORK

The unbundling of work can be expected to continue in the coming years.⁴¹ As outlined earlier, non-standard work is increasingly common today as compared with 40 years ago, and it is now likely to accelerate. Driven by automation, the platform economy and corporate strategies, more full-time and part-time jobs will be broken down into their constituent bundles of tasks and become temporary gigs and microtasks.

Firms are likely to accelerate investments in automation to enhance worker and consumer safety, while also mitigating the risks of workers being unable to work due to illness or otherwise affected by public health-mandated lockdowns.^{42,43} As noted by Oxford University's Carl Benedikt Frey, more routine jobs are likely to disappear due to the COVID-19 economic downturn, and consumers are also likely to opt for cheaper, less labour-intensive goods and services.⁴⁴ Both these factors can be expected to drive further automation in the economy and disproportionately impact low-income earners.

Studies conducted pre-pandemic estimated that anywhere between 6% and 59% of existing jobs were at high risk of automation over the next 10 to 50 years.⁴⁵ Many low-income Canadians are disproportionately impacted by COVID-19 from both a health and unemployment risk perspective.^{46,47} Additionally, low-wage positions are more likely to be automated than higher-wage roles. Consequently, opportunities for roles with much wage growth or stability could be severely compromised for lower-income Canadians as firms accelerate their automation plans.

As workers and firms have been forced to become increasingly familiar with teleworking during the pandemic, it's also possible this will lead to an increase in the uptake of online labour platforms to mediate working arrangements. Canadian software firm OpenText announced it is permanently closing half of its global offices in light of high levels of productivity while 95% of employees work remotely during the pandemic.⁴⁸ One U.S. analyst predicts more than 25% of workers will keep working remotely post-pandemic, compared with fewer than 4% who worked from home before the crisis.⁴⁹

If workers are increasingly out of sight and working from home in Mississauga rather than downtown Toronto, it's not a big leap to see those same tasks being outsourced to Nairobi or Mumbai. Between 2016 and 2020, online freelance digital work postings on platforms such as Fiverr, Freelancer and Guru doubled in Canada.⁵⁰ In an environment where every expense will be scrupulously examined, shifting even more tasks online in search of efficiencies seems like a natural next step.

Taken together, it's likely that in the years ahead fewer Canadians will be engaged in standard employment relationships, and more will be tenuously attached to an increasingly fissured, digital, precarious world of work. This could be a particular challenge for young Canadians entering a labour market equaled in turmoil only by the Great Depression, as well as for lower-income Canadians and women. They are overrepresented in sectors such as retail and accommodation likely to be hit hardest over the medium term by social distancing measures.⁵¹

DEGLOBALIZATION AND RESHORING

The status of global trade and migration is another area brought into question by the pandemic. The World Trade Organization estimates that global merchandise trade will decline by between 13% to 32% in 2020, while trade in services will also be hit hard as a result of travel restrictions and border closures.⁵² Many observers anticipate that the vulnerabilities of global supply chains revealed by COVID-19 could lead to a reshoring of certain key manufacturing capabilities, highlighted by shortages in many countries of vital medical equipment such as ventilators and face masks.^{53,54} Even telemarketing capabilities abroad have been limited by the pandemic, forcing some Canadian firms to scramble to ramp up domestic capacity to help customers using staff from other business lines.⁵⁵

This could reverse trends in countries like Canada, which have seen slow, steady declines of employment in goods-producing industries over the past few decades. Only 20.7% of Canadians in 2019 were employed in goods-producing sectors, compared with 34.5% in 1976. A renaissance in manufacturing across the board may be unlikely, but certain sectors of vital national interest could see a rebound in employment, and many of those jobs could potentially be higher-wage, secure positions.

How the pandemic will affect the flow of people, in addition to goods, is another key policy unknown. The United States announced a two-month ban on immigrants seeking to live and work in the country permanently, ostensibly as a means of protecting American workers from competition in a fragile economic environment.⁵⁶ Canada doesn't appear set to follow suit, but one could imagine a scenario in which immigration is limited or capped to ease job seekers' fears. This would likely be a counterproductive approach that would actually constrain growth, while also flying in the face of long-standing support for immigration in the country.⁵⁷

INCREASED CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND DIGITIZATION

Large, well-capitalized incumbents are likely to consolidate and expand their dominance of key sectors of the economy in the coming months and years. Many small and medium enterprises in the retail, food services and restaurant, tourism and hospitality sectors have been dealt a body blow from the forced closure or dramatic scaling-back of their operations due to social distancing and stay-at-home protocols. Larger Canadian companies (more than 100 employees) have been relatively better insulated from job losses, with employment declining by 12.6% between February and April 2020. Small firms (fewer than 20 employees) saw a far more dramatic fall of 30.8%.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, digital businesses such as Amazon are able to navigate relatively seamlessly a world that prefers online shopping and home delivery. Amazon hired 175,000 workers to meet demand in its warehouses in March and April, and its stock price has soared as more consumers shopped with their phones and computers.⁵⁹ Microsoft, Amazon and Apple, America's three most valuable companies, saw their stock values rise by more than a cumulative \$750 billion in the month after the U.S. stock market bottomed out in late March, exceeding the gains of the bottom half of all companies in the S&P 500.⁶⁰



The immediate economic fallout of the pandemic has largely been borne by those who were already struggling to get by.

Other large chains in the retail and food services sector are also likely to weather the economic storm more successfully, with higher levels of cash savings and more cash flow generally. According to one U.S. study, chain restaurants took 75% of money spent eating out in the first month of the pandemic, significantly higher than average.^{61,62} In the words of Thomas Philippon, a professor of finance at New York University, “The firms that were the top dogs going into the crisis also happen to have the most resilient business models because they can do everything online. It turns out Amazon was one of the most successful businesses in the U.S., and on top of it, they are the ones who can keep processing orders.”⁶³

Increased consolidation in a number of sectors, including retail, airlines, telecommunications and beer, has been occurring steadily in recent years in both the U.S. and Canada.^{64,65} In Canada's food and beverage sector alone, four large companies dominate meat production, while five companies control 80% of the consumer grocery market.⁶⁶ These trends are likely to persist and accelerate in a time of great economic stress, as smaller, independent and generally less well-capitalized firms in the hospitality, restaurant and retail sectors will invariably struggle to make rent payments and reach pre-pandemic revenue streams. The larger firms that can survive will reap the rewards of consumer spending gradually returning to pre-pandemic levels over time in less competitive marketplaces.

Compounding this shift will be a continued acceleration in the digital transformation of various sectors, with more activity taking place online. These trends are not new, but could speed up rapidly if consumer habits around shopping from home for groceries and other goods become hardwired. Revenues of the top five global e-commerce retailers grew, on average, by 32% a year between 2008 and 2016, while revenue growth across the European Union retail sector averaged only 1% a year during the same period.⁶⁷

From telemedicine to teaching, the pandemic has rapidly accelerated the digital shift in a range of industries. At the end of April 2020, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella observed that the “past two months have seen digitisation progression that would ordinarily take two years generated by the demands of remote working and the need for accurate data and intelligence.”⁶⁸

By late April, Amazon’s shares had gained close to 26% in 2020 as its retail arm filled the void of shuttered bricks and mortar stores.⁶⁹ Its streaming service, online gaming platform and cloud computing services have also benefited significantly from more people at home seeking alternative work arrangements and forms of entertainment.



Digital businesses, larger companies and firms that can leverage data and consumer insights to pivot quickly in a rapidly changing environment are likely to emerge even stronger from the pandemic than they were before.


These trends pose real risks for workers and job quality. They could lead to increasingly fissured workplaces with complex subcontracting and outsourcing arrangements, where workers are further distanced from the corporation that actually profits from their labour.⁷⁰ A smaller number of employers could also lead to less competitive labour markets where wages and benefits are suppressed.⁷¹

DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACTS, WORSENING INCOME INEQUALITY AND POVERTY

The immediate economic fallout of the pandemic has largely been borne by those who were already struggling to get by. As Miles Corak, economics professor at the City University of New York, wrote, “The foot soldiers in this very first economic battle against COVID-19 were the young and women, those who work in part-time and temporary jobs, with no union contracts and lower wages. Students and those who were already unemployed were also out of luck finding their next job.”⁷² A study from the C.D. Howe Institute found that the early impacts of working hours lost were disproportionately felt by lower-wage workers and women.⁷³


Statistics Canada's labour force survey data released on May 8, 2020, noted that "employment losses continued to be more rapid in jobs offering less security, including temporary and non-unionized jobs." Temporary employees saw a drop in employment between February and April 2020 of 30.2%, compared with a 17.8% rate for all paid employees. Employees making less than two-thirds of the 2019 median hourly wage (\$24.04) experienced a 38.1% drop in employment.⁷⁴ Salaried workers saw far less of an impact on hours worked than workers paid by the hour, and lower-wage workers generally experienced far greater losses of jobs and hours than higher-wage workers.

Percentage of workers who lost jobs or majority of hours, by wage February - April 2020



Source: David Macdonald, CCPA, <https://twitter.com/DavidMacCdn/status/1258749478292664321/photo/1>

Percentage change in aggregate hours worked by paid employees, February - April 2020



Source: Mikal Skuterud, University of Waterloo, Globe and Mail: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-job-market-has-split-in-two-in-the-coronavirus-crisis/>



Armine Yalnizyan, Atkinson Fellow on the Future of Workers, has argued that the pandemic will bring about the first “she-cession,” as sectors such as retail, child care and education that employ high numbers of women have been hit hard.

While female-led recoveries have historically followed recessionary periods through increased labour market participation by women, she questions whether that will be possible this time.⁷⁵

The long-term impacts of this economic downturn on young people’s employment prospects and earnings potential are also in question. Phil Oreopolous, economics professor at the University of Toronto, notes that those graduating into a recession in the 1980s and 1990s lost, on average, 5% of their lifetime earnings compared with peers graduating in better economic times. He argues that the effects of the COVID-19 recession could be even worse.⁷⁶

The pandemic has also highlighted the acute needs of the homeless and those in long-term care facilities across the country (not to mention those working in such facilities for low wages and in precarious employment relationships). Both groups are at significantly higher risk of contracting COVID-19, and population groups “lacking access to health services in normal circumstances are left most vulnerable during times of crisis.”⁷⁷ Similarly, ethnic groups including Black, Latin American and South Asian Canadians appear likely to struggle economically as the pandemic challenges household budgets.⁷⁸



Looking ahead, it would be no surprise to see poverty rates in Canada increase as unemployment challenges persist and emergency benefits are reduced or eliminated amid the largest economic contraction since the Great Depression.^{79,80}

Furthermore, after two decades of relatively stable income inequality levels, early signs point to those at the bottom of the labour market ladder being at high risk of falling further behind, while high-wage earners could be relatively well insulated from economic hardship. Groups including recent immigrants and refugees, racialized communities, young people and women are likely to face significant economic headwinds as the pandemic continues to unfold, which will also have significant social implications for Canada.

FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AGENDA IN THE MEDIUM TERM

Canada is racking up a historic budget deficit to mitigate effects of the pandemic on workers, firms, students and specific sectors of the economy. As of April 24, the Parliamentary Budget Office estimated that federal economic stimulus measures would contribute to a 2020-21 deficit of \$252.1 billion, or 12.7% of GDP. This

would be the largest budget deficit as a share of GDP on record (since 1966-67), more than 50% higher proportionally than the 8% mark in 1984-85.⁸¹ While 2021-22 budget figures aren't yet known, another significant deficit can be expected.

The only comparable deficit-spending program in Canadian history occurred during the Second World War, when deficit to GDP ratios ranged from 17.6% in 1945 to 22.5% in 1942.⁸² With interest rates currently sitting at historic lows, borrowing costs for the federal government are not a significant constraint on further debt accumulation. However, it's also unlikely that the economy will grow itself out of a large debt as easily as it did after the Second World War. GDP growth in Canada averaged 3.1% between 1967 and 2017, while projections for the next 50 years are half that level, at 1.5%.⁸³

Subnational debts are also mounting, with provincial governments deficit-spending to shore up health and social services and combined budget balances in 2020-21 expected to be more than \$60 billion in the red.⁸⁴ Municipalities are also being hit hard by reduced revenues and heightened expenses, with Toronto anticipating a \$780 million shortfall over three months, and Vancouver and Montreal expecting to be hundreds of millions short of needs as a result of the pandemic.⁸⁵

Conversations are already turning to when Canadian governments should start to look at returning to a more normalized fiscal environment and wind down emergency measures such as the Canada Emergency Response Benefit.⁸⁶⁸⁷⁸⁸ Similar themes emerged after the 2008-09 financial crisis and early 1990s recession, with program review exercises and a concerted effort to bring debt under control at both the federal and provincial levels. It is likely these types of exercises will be undertaken once the health concerns of the pandemic are under control, particularly given the unprecedented size of the debt being incurred.

Consequently, the time horizon to move forward with transformative policy solutions around the quality of work is probably shorter than it might appear. This underlines the importance of identifying high-impact, implementable solutions as quickly as possible.

POLICY OPTIONS TO DRIVE DECENT WORK

Both the federal and provincial governments should look to introduce new minimum wage levels set between 60% and 70% of the median wage in their jurisdictions.

Where should policymakers focus their attention when it comes to the (near) future of work, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic? Long-standing issues around income inequality, job precarity and wage stagnation are likely to become more prevalent in the coming years. As more industries rapidly digitize and more goods and tasks are traded online, we can expect to see an increase in digital platforms as the default marketplaces for both consumers and business.

We may see an increase in opportunities within the manufacturing sector due to reshoring, and construction will continue to benefit from a likely infusion of public infrastructure investments. The

health-care sector, and particularly long-term care homes, could see an increase in quality jobs given population aging and heightened scrutiny on conditions within the sector.

A probable medium-term focus on fiscal restraint also means that government program expenditures and policy interventions will need to be laser-focused on outcomes, digital delivery, implementation fidelity and partnerships. Wringing every possible dollar out of public investments to support a robust and inclusive economic agenda will be vital.

Some policy interventions can be taken up with relatively little public investment—shaping how workers are treated through effective labour regulations, for example. Other approaches are cross-cutting—increased system resilience through development of a national digital infrastructure or enhancing strategic foresight capacity within the public sector. Finally, some key policy frameworks require an overhaul to be up to the challenges ahead: employment insurance and skills-training sit at the top of that list.

Each of these categories are outlined below, with some illustrative examples of how best to move forward to promote an economy that emphasizes quality work and good opportunities for Canadians. This imperative will help ensure that Canada's economy remains prosperous, globally competitive and resilient in an increasingly turbulent global environment.

MARKET-SHAPING APPROACHES

A relatively lower-cost approach for governments to boost job quality is through regulatory intervention — shaping and moulding the contours of a marketplace and setting minimum standards for certain behaviours and actions. While compliance and enforcement efforts to support such interventions are not free, they can be far less costly than direct grants or subsidies, and also scale to a far greater level.

Given the likely trajectory of the future of work in coming years, it's important to consider which types of regulatory interventions will yield the most benefit, address relevant challenges and are targeted at the appropriate actors. Some ideas worth considering in this regard include:

- **Mandating greater use of community benefit agreements (CBAs) attached to public infrastructure projects.** If we anticipate significant infrastructure investments as part of economic stimulus packages (on top of \$700 billion in already planned investments in the next decade), a key area of focus should be the use of CBAs that provide benefits to communities such as access to apprenticeship training for marginalized communities and boosting social procurement.⁸⁹ Hundreds of billions of dollars in investments could lead to tens of thousands of well-paying jobs for historically disadvantaged groups. With the construction industry already facing significant labour shortages, this approach also offers the benefit of being timely and urgently needed.⁹⁰ Designing pathways into these jobs that ensure success and inclusion will be a critical success factor.
- **Instituting a higher minimum wage.** Both the federal and provincial governments should look to introduce new minimum wage levels set between 60 % and 70% of the median wage in their jurisdictions. Higher minimum wage levels could have a strong effect on moderating income inequality, particularly for those at the bottom of the wage distribution.⁹¹ In a period where workers may have less bargaining power and job security than ever, setting a minimum floor on earnings would be a simple way to help more Canadians struggling to make ends meet.⁹²
- **Tightening the legal definition of independent contractor.** We are likely to see even more firms seek to classify workers as independent contractors rather than employees in the coming years, to minimize statutory obligations and responsibilities (e.g., avoiding payroll deductions) and shift more risks onto the worker. The federal government should clarify the definitions for employee and independent contractor in Part III of the Canada Labour Code, to avoid the need for case-by-case determinations.⁹³ Provincial governments should, where applicable, look to ensure misclassification does not occur and make clear that the onus is on employers to demonstrate a worker is not an employee when they assert rights under employment standards legislation.
- **Easing restrictions on unionization and exploring alternatives to collective representation in the private sector.** In an environment of increased corporate concentration, it will become increasingly important to let workers collectively join together to assert their rights with employers with regards to pay, benefits or overall working conditions. Between one-third and 40% of non-unionized workers in Canada would like to join a union if they had the opportunity, while more than 70% of workers would be interested in joining non-union organizations that would discuss workplace issues with management.^{94,95} Both the federal and provincial governments should conduct systematic reviews of labour legislation to explore the best means

of enhancing workers' collective voice, including examining legal barriers to unionization (e.g., secret-ballot certification elections and cooling-off periods), support for third-party worker advocates and introducing anti-reprisal protections for concerted activity modelled on section 7 of the U.S. National Labor Relations Act.⁹⁶

A range of other market-shaping ideas and initiatives should also be explored, many of which were outlined in the 2018 Mowat Centre report *Race to the Top: Developing an Inclusive Growth Agenda for Canada*.⁹⁷ These include heightened wage transparency, sectoral bargaining, joint liability provisions where work is subcontracted, a review of the tax system, enforcing pay equity targets and promoting the development of platform co-operatives.

To drive a more equitable recovery, a key focus with any of these initiatives must be assessing their impact on historically marginalized groups who are also likely to be most significantly impacted by the economic downturn. Developing clear targets and measures, and ensuring data sources are available to track the progress of these initiatives, will be a critical success factor that cannot be overlooked.

SYSTEM RESILIENCE

Digital Infrastructure

For both the public and private sectors, the critical importance of modern digital infrastructure and tools has been underlined in recent months. Government officials warned the Prime Minister in late 2019 of “rusting out and at risk of failure” IT systems, some of which are pushing 60 years of age.⁹⁸ These issues have been identified for more than 20 years by the government itself, the Office of the Auditor General and outside observers.⁹⁹

With an unprecedented flood of applicants for EI, many Canadians were left frustrated by interminable wait times as call centres struggled to cope with questions and issues.¹⁰⁰ The roll-out of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit was much smoother, largely because the program is designed to assume eligibility and deal with enforcement or ineligibility issues after the fact, rather than the typical, more bureaucratic and time-consuming approach of assessing eligibility before benefits flow.

The critical need to invest in more capable, nimble technology infrastructure at all levels of government has never been clearer. Delivering benefits and services more quickly and efficiently will require a top to bottom rethink, investments in relevant blockchain, cloud computing and AI capabilities, and hiring thousands of new civil servants with the skills and capabilities to reinvent government through a digital lens. Many countries around the world, ranging from Denmark and Estonia to Singapore and the United Kingdom, have demonstrated the possibility of transforming government services through smart investments.¹⁰¹

The public sector also has a key role in promoting more accessible and affordable mobile and high-speed internet connections for citizens. While Canada ranks relatively well in terms of availability and quality of digital access, wireless costs are among the highest in the world for advanced economies.¹⁰²



Moving quickly to deploy 5G technology, while also driving down costs for wireless and ensuring that rural, remote and Indigenous communities are connected digitally, must be key policy priorities in the months ahead.

Smarter Policy and Program Approaches

Governments should not start and stop their modernization approaches at the digital window, however. A range of innovative and effective approaches to modern government in the 21st century have been explored to varying extents in Canada, but now must be broadly adopted and accelerated to ensure the best outcomes at the lowest possible costs. These include:

- Mainstreaming the use of behavioural insights to shape choices in ways that benefit individuals and society. For example, changing defaults for workplace pension enrollment to opt-out rather than opt-in have dramatically increased take-up rates.¹⁰³
- Expanding the use of outcomes-based funding approaches such as pay-for-performance schemes to drive better results in areas such as retraining initiatives and criminal justice reform.¹⁰⁴
- Integrating service delivery approaches across government departments and between levels of government to better serve clients and avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap. Successful models of human services integration in Australia, Canada and elsewhere should serve as models for opportunities in other policy areas.¹⁰⁵
- Institutionalizing policy formulation approaches that incorporate techniques such as design labs and foresight exercises to consider a broader range of plausible scenarios and perspectives.^{106,107}
- Renewing efforts to partner with outside entities from the non-profit, educational and private sectors to scale up successful initiatives, while also seeking opportunities to integrate and partner with other levels of government in areas such as economic development.
- Focusing on delivery through central stock-taking units, to ensure that key policy priorities are executed and stay on track.¹⁰⁸



Governments around the world have the opportunity to hit the reset button coming out of the pandemic. Citizens will be open to new approaches that promise to deliver better results, more efficiently and quickly.

The above-noted areas have all demonstrated they can deliver value for both citizens and governments. The challenge will be how to adopt and implement these approaches at scale, in the immediate aftermath of a crisis with many competing priorities. Deploying proven approaches to change management with civil servants and key stakeholders aimed at more resilient, smarter government will be essential to ensuring the ongoing success of any, or all, of these approaches.

Finally, governments must consider how they can collectively work together in a more effective way to tackle critical cross-border issues in the digital era. Whether in the areas of competition law, taxation of digital platforms or regulation of online labour, there is a growing need for regulators and policymakers to operate globally, as companies do, to avoid race to the bottom scenarios and jurisdiction-shopping that serve to erode higher standards.

MODERNIZING POLICY FRAMEWORKS

Now is the time to look closely at our skills-training system and reboot it for the digital era.



A broad range of policy frameworks in Canada should be reconsidered and modernized to adapt to our new economic and social reality. Almost no area of social and economic policy is off the table. This includes thinking about how universal childcare could further support women's labour market participation or how broader access to mental health supports and pharmacare will be vital to easing the psychological and financial stresses many Canadians will increasingly face. Some of the other complex areas relevant to the future world of work we have quickly found ourselves immersed in include affordable housing, social assistance,

the education system as a whole, digital access, rejigging intergovernmental fiscal relationships and tax policy.

For the purposes of this paper, however, the focus of potential policy reinvention will be two-fold: Canada's skills-training ecosystem and the employment insurance system. Both were already under stress before the pandemic, but now more than ever we must rethink supports for unemployed and underemployed Canadians and the urgency of reskilling Canadians for an increasingly chaotic, digital and precarious world of work. Some ideas on how to best do so are outlined below.

Skills Training

Economic orthodoxy in recent years has regarded public infrastructure investment as the best way to stimulate economic activity: get shovels in the ground and bridges, roads and transit projects underway to put people to work and build much-needed infrastructure. The significant hit to the service sector in the COVID-19 economic downturn, however, raises the question of whether investing in “human infrastructure” might be a better bet to help groups such as women, younger workers and racialized communities get back on their feet and thrive in an even more competitive and tough labour market.

Many workers kept at home due to work closures or seeing their hours reduced would be able to upgrade their skills if accessible, relevant training was available. Now is the time to look closely at our skills-training system and reboot it for the digital era. Canada has historically lagged behind its advanced economy peers in the area of public investment in skills training and active labour market policies.¹⁰⁹



Employer spending on worker training has also declined in recent decades.¹¹⁰ Most troubling, many of the non-standard, gig workers who are on the fringes of the labour market are often ineligible for skills-training programs.¹¹¹

Furthermore, the quality of programs has often been poor. Too often, there’s little to show for government-funded skills training. Ontario’s Auditor General, for example, found in 2015-16 that fewer than 40% of Employment Ontario clients were employed full-time after program completion, with only 14% finding more suitable jobs, jobs in their field or professional occupations.¹¹²

Investment levels are a choice of magnitude, while eligibility is also relatively simply addressed (though it comes, of course, with a price tag). The quality of programs and interventions is more complex and challenging to remedy, and should be the key focus of policymakers.

Reskilling will also help smooth transitions as different sectors (e.g., logistics, warehousing, health care) experience high levels of demand in the post-pandemic world. It will also enable workers to adjust to what seems inevitably to be a more digital landscape in almost every sector.

A number of approaches to skills development and retraining from around the globe have either demonstrated success over the longer term or are showing promising signs of delivering strong results. Some of these initiatives are led by governments or the private sector, while others are the result of public-private partnerships. Although their details vary, many of the most successful approaches share some or all of five key design features that appear to be common characteristics of successful interventions:

- An emphasis on digital delivery of services and/or digital platforms providing information to clients and between other key partners;
- A strong focus on outcomes and placing program participants in quality jobs;
- Well-established evaluation frameworks that provide rigorous evidence of what works and what doesn't;
- The flexibility to adapt to the specific circumstances and needs of the clients being served;
- Integration with other program and policy interventions designed to enable wrap-around approaches that focus scarce resources effectively.

Denmark's Flexicurity Program

Denmark's national employment system, commonly referred to as the "flexicurity" model, combines flexibility and security in a highly structured and integrated approach to retraining and reintegrating citizens into the labour market.¹¹³ The system comprises three main pillars:

- A flexible labour market system of regulations that permits high degrees of mobility between jobs (up to 25% of Danes in the private sector switch jobs every year);
- A generous income support system for unemployed Danes (up to two years of benefits at up to 90% income replacement for low-income workers);
- Significant investments in labour market policies aimed at income support, re-employment and upskilling (more than 3% of GDP in 2017). This compares with 0.78% of GDP spent by Canada.¹¹⁴

Vitality, the system is informed by rigorous evaluation, and municipalities can only deliver proven successful programs. Led by the Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment (STAR), researchers are funded to conduct high-quality studies on both domestic and international active labour market programs, and the results are made broadly available to stakeholders.¹¹⁵

Denmark's system also deploys financial incentives to focus stakeholders on achieving key outcomes, by providing municipalities with funding to engage early and proactively with individuals seeking employment or training opportunities. Additionally, those under age 25 are specifically targeted and encouraged to enroll in active labour market programs. The system also relies heavily on technology to provide up-to-date information to municipalities, job seekers and case workers about current job openings that match a job seeker's CV.¹¹⁶

Colorado's Swiss Apprenticeship Model

A long-standing challenge in Canada has been low rates of apprenticeship completion for the skilled trades, typically in the range of 50%.¹¹⁷ One model that bears watching to improve completion rates is in the southwestern United States. In 2016, Colorado began to implement a statewide approach to apprenticeships to address employers' concerns that they weren't able to find qualified candidates for so-called "middle skill" positions.¹¹⁸ The state established a Work-Based Learning Unit within the Department of Labor and Employment to co-ordinate government efforts around experiential learning, including working with existing apprenticeship programs and developing partnerships with industry to establish new programs.

One such new program is CareerWise Colorado, a non-profit intermediary organization that works with industry associations to identify key in-demand skills in career areas such as advanced manufacturing, hospitality and financial services. Under this program, three-year paid internships, which begin in high school, have been created for 10 different training plans. These plans, which pay participants \$30,000 for the duration of the apprenticeship, provide students with up to a year of college credits and industry certifications. The apprenticeships are also designed to impart specific competencies to students that are aligned with their training pathway and identified as priorities by business groups. The goal is to have 20,000 students complete the program by 2027.^{119,120}

Colorado's approach is modelled after the long-standing commitment to apprenticeships found in Switzerland, where 70% of high school graduates participate in apprenticeships and much of a student's week involves experiential learning in addition to traditional classroom work.¹²¹ Roughly 30% of Swiss companies participate in the country's apprenticeship system, which provides students with nationally recognized portable qualifications in 240 occupations ranging from traditional trades to banking and health care.¹²² Switzerland's system underwent a major transformation in 2004 to focus on competency- and project-based learning, including "soft" skills particular to each industry.

The system was developed based on extensive feedback from across sectors—industry, government and education—and builds on vocational training legislation and initiatives dating back to the 1930s.¹²³ Switzerland's youth unemployment rate is one of the lowest in the world—just 7.9% in 2018—while its overall unemployment rate is also historically one of the world's lowest.¹²⁴

Initiatives to watch

A range of other programs are also worth tracking as they evolve and mature, including:

- ManpowerGroup has joined forces with the IT firm Experis in India to develop a 40-day “boot camp” for in-demand computer coding and database skills. In 2017, the program saw a 97% placement rate for 1,500 graduates, including more than 700 women.¹²⁵
- Singapore’s highly-touted SkillsFuture initiative empowers individuals to embark on a lifelong-learning journey through training credits, robust information about promising career pathways and integrated and adaptive training and educational supports.¹²⁶
- Catalyte, a U.S. firm that uses artificial intelligence to identify people with the potential to become software developers, provides guaranteed jobs to those who graduate from its training and apprenticeship program. More than 1,000 graduates from non-traditional backgrounds have landed positions through the program.¹²⁷
- Amazon plans to retrain one-third of its U.S.-based employees, about 100,000 people. The aim is to help workers “move into highly skilled technical and non-technical roles” within Amazon “or pursue career paths outside of Amazon.”¹²⁸ The initiative will expand targeted in-house training programs designed to help employees move into more highly skilled roles in areas of projected need within Amazon. It will also provide tuition credits for low-skilled fulfillment centre workers to access education at traditional post-secondary institutions.¹²⁹

Taken together, these initiatives demonstrate the value of employer-led programs and partnerships with multi-stakeholder coalitions, digitally delivered solutions, outcomes-based approaches with rigorous evaluations, and flexible services adapted to clients’ unique circumstances. These characteristics ought to be at the heart of any options considered as governments, industry and other partners evaluate the skills-training and upskilling approaches that will be most effective in a post-pandemic future.

Employment Insurance

Much has been written about the shortfalls of the employment insurance system in Canada. Too bureaucratic, unnecessarily tight eligibility criteria, regional disparities and insufficient benefit levels and duration are the most common criticisms.¹³⁰

With roughly 40% of unemployed Canadians being eligible for the program, the question arises: who’s being insured and who isn’t? Increasingly, the answer to the latter question is recent immigrants, gig workers, young people and women, who are overrepresented in temporary and part-time work. They are thus less likely to meet minimum thresholds for eligibility and, even if they do, qualify for a shorter period of benefits.¹³¹ Only 17% of self-employed workers and 20% of part-time workers receive EI.¹³² If non-standard

work increases in the years ahead, the gaping holes in EI coverage that have been present for decades will only become more evident.

The rapid introduction and deployment of the Canada Emergency Response Benefit, largely driven by the shortfalls of the EI system, have further highlighted the need for EI reform.

A range of possible fixes exist for EI, from simple and quick to a complete overhaul that would need to be considered alongside reforms to other income supports such as the Canada Workers Benefit, Canada Child Benefit and provincial social assistance reforms.

Setting aside reforms to EI special benefits (e.g., maternity, parental, adoption, sick and compassionate care leave), some key approaches should inform a modernization of the regular unemployment benefits stream of the EI program. These include:

- Adopt a nationally consistent entrance requirement (with a lower hour threshold), duration period for benefits and benefit formula;
- Separate eligibility for skills-training programs from EI eligibility, and move toward tying the duration of benefits to enrollment in skills-training programs;
- Increase access to income supports for non-standard workers, either through expanding the EI program or introducing a temporary unemployment assistance program designed for such workers.¹³³

A broader issue that merits consideration is rethinking the nature of EI as a contributory insurance program funded primarily through worker and employer contributions.¹³⁴ If the scope of the program is expanded to include self-employed and gig workers who don't pay into the program, it may make sense for the federal government to return to the pre-1990 approach and co-fund the program. A co-equal federal partner at the table could reduce premiums for employers and employees, while also broadening the base of eligible workers.



Adopting a more inclusive approach to income supports for unemployed workers—modelled along Denmark's flexicurity system, with accompanying investments in skills training—is perhaps the best approach Canada could take in the coming years.

This would ensure Canadians don't fall through the cracks of our social architecture, while also positioning them to thrive in the new economy.

This will require high levels of investment and rigorous focus on evaluating the outcomes of skills-training and re-employment initiatives. It will also demand a commitment to partnering with the private sector and post-secondary institutions to ensure training and supports lead toward meaningful, quality employment opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Hitting the mark with policy renewal will generate inclusive opportunities for those who need them the most and propel Canada into the future as a more united and prosperous nation.

The depth and breadth of the challenges facing policymakers in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented. Almost every sector of the economy is in a state of turmoil, millions of workers have been laid off or had their hours reduced, and there is massive uncertainty around when, or if, life might return to some sense of normalcy. Against this backdrop, it would be easy to keep the ship steering in the same direction and hope things will be alright once the storm passes.

However, Canada's social architecture already had gaping holes before the pandemic that were leaving too many behind. Coming out of this crisis without addressing those gaps, some of which will be bigger still as a result of the pandemic, would be a massive missed opportunity. We can press the reset button on how we formulate public policy frameworks and deliver public services and EI and skills-training programs, and reshape markets to be fairer and more inclusive.

Doing so will require deep commitment and focus, not to mention close partnerships with a range of stakeholders and a willingness to abandon past practices and embrace new, emerging models in the spheres of policy and administration. Hitting the mark with policy renewal will generate inclusive opportunities for those who need them the most and propel Canada into the future as a more united and prosperous nation. Failing to do so will leave us with a more fractured and unequal society. When faced with those possible outcomes, there is really only one clear choice for how to proceed.

ENDNOTES

¹ Statistics Canada. (2020). Table: 11-10-0134-01. Gini Coefficients of Adjusted Market, Total and After-tax Income. Government of Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1110013401>

² Johal, S., Yalnizyan, A., (2018). Race to the Top; Developing an Inclusive Growth Agenda for Canada. The Mowat Center. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/race-to-the-top/>

³ Statistics Canada. (2018). The Fall and Rise of Canada's Top Income Earners. Government of Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2016009-eng.htm>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ OECD. (2015). In it Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All. OECD Publishing.

<http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm>

⁶ Johal, S., Yalnizyan, A., (2018). Race to the Top: Developing an Inclusive Growth Agenda for Canada. The Mowat Centre. https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/wp-content/uploads/publications/164_race_to_the_top.pdf

⁷ Green, D., Riddell, C., St-Hilaire, F., (2017). Income Inequality in Canada: Driving Forces, Outcomes and Policy. Income Inequality: The Canadian Story. IRPP. <https://irpp.org/fr/research-studies/income-inequality-in-canada/>

⁸ Defined as: Aboriginal persons living off-reserve; recent immigrants; lone parents, defined as a family with only one parent and with at least one child; persons with disabilities; and unattached persons ages 45 to 64 living on their own.

Fang, T., Gunderson, M., (2019). Poverty Dynamics among Vulnerable Groups in Canada. Income Inequality: The Canadian Story. IRPP. <https://irpp.org/research-studies/poverty-dynamics-among-vulnerable-groups-in-canada/>

⁹ OECD, (2015). In it Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All." OECD Publishing

<http://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm>

¹⁰ Busby, C., Muthukumaran, R. (2016). Precarious Positions: Policy Options to Mitigate Risks in Non-Standard Employment. C.D. Howe Institute.

https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary%20462_0.p

¹¹ Randstad. (2017). Workforce 2025. Randstad. <http://content.randstad.ca/hubfs/workforce2025/Workforce-2025-Randstad-Part1.pdf>

¹² Bank of Canada, (2019). The Size and Characteristics of Informal ("gig") Work in Canada.

<https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/san2019-6.pdf>

¹³ Martin, C., Lewchuk, W., (2018). The Generation Effect: Millennials, Employment Precarity and the 21st Century Workplace. McMaster University and PEPSO. <https://pepso.ca/documents/the-generation-effect-executive-summary.pdf>

¹⁴ Statistics Canada (2020). Table 14-10-0051-01. Job tenure by type of work. Government of Canada.

<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410005101>

¹⁵ Noack, M., Vosko, F., Grundy, J., (2015). Measuring Employment Standards Violations, Evasion and Erosion—Using a Telephone Survey. 70(1), 86–109. Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations.

<https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ri/2015-v70-n1-ri01771/1029281ar/abstract/>

-
- ¹⁶ Block, S., Galabuzi, E., (2011). Canada's Colour Coded Labour Market. Wellesley Institute.
https://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Colour_Coded_Labour_MarketFINAL.pdf
- ¹⁷ Cranford, C., Vosko, F., Zukewich, N. (2003). Precarious Employment in the Canadian Labour Market: A statistical Portrait. *Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society*, 3, 6–22.
<http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volume3/pdfs/cranfordetal.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario (PEPSO). (2015). The precarity penalty. PEPSO.
<https://pepso.ca/documents/precarity-penalty.pdf>
- ¹⁹ Government of Ontario. (2019). The Changing Workplaces Review. Government of Ontario archived document.
https://www.ontario.ca/document/changing-workplaces-review-final-report?_ga=2.196923685.845944588.1589136984-1290681475.1589136984
- ²⁰ Employment and Social Development Canada. (2019). Report of the expert panel on modern federal labour standards. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/expert-panel-final/expert-panel-final-report-20190826.pdf>
- ²¹ Riddell, C. (2004). Union Certification Success under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures. *ILR Review*, Vol. 57, Issue 4.
<https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol57/iss4/1/?referer=http%253A%252F%252Fflawofwork.ca%252F%253Fp%253D65>
- ²² Bentham, Karen J. (2004). Employer Resistance to Union Certification: A Study of Eight Canadian Jurisdictions. *Erudit journals: Relations industrielles*, Vol. 25, Number 1, hiver 2002, pp. 3-221.
<https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ri/2002-v57-n1-ri518/006714ar/>
- ²³ Fang, T., & Verma, A. (2002). [Union wage premium](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265399770_Union_Wage_Premium). *Perspectives on Labour and Income*, 14(4), 17 to 23.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265399770_Union_Wage_Premium
- ²⁴ Statistics Canada. (2019). Distribution of market, total and after-tax income by economic family type, Canada, provinces and selected Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs).
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1110023701#timeframe>
- ²⁵ Russel, E., and Dufour, M. (2007). Rising profit shares, falling wage shares. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. http://policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2007/Rising_Profit_Shares_Falling_Wage_Shares.pdf
- ²⁶ Ministry of Finance for the Government of Ontario. (2017). Ontario's Long-Term Report on the Economy, Chapter 3: Employment Trends. Government of Ontario.
<https://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/economy/ltr/2017/ch3.html>
- ²⁷ Simpson, S. (2019). Nearly half (48%; +2pts) of Canadians on the brink of financial insolvency; Struggling to make ends meet at month-end. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/MNP-Debt-Index-Wave-8>
- ²⁸ Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. (2019). Canadians and their money: Key findings from the 2019 Canadian financial capability survey. <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/fcac-acfc/documents/programs/research-surveys-studies-reports/canadian-financial-capability-survey-2019.pdf>
- ²⁹ Peetz, J., and Robson, J. (2019). The perils of living paycheck to paycheck: The relationship between income volatility and financial insecurity. Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada.

<https://www.cpacanada.ca/-/media/site/operational/sc-strategic-communications/docs/the-perils-of-living-paycheque-to-paycheque.pdf?la=en&hash=FC8007A20E06DE96A440DA4067AA80EDCD9D6860>

³⁰ TD Bank Group (2017). Pervasive and Profound: The impact of income volatility on Canadians. TD Bank Group. https://td-capa.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/_default/0001/01/2ed95a1a680ea5b78ab53646f1f432f51405bc02.pdf

³¹ D'Souza, C. and Williams, D.. (2017). The Digital Economy. Bank of Canada Review, Spring 2017. <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/boc-review-spring17-dsouza.pdf>

³² Brown, David. (2019). Google, Facebook capture 74% of digital ad revenue. The Message, January 11, 2019. <https://the-message.ca/2019/01/11/google-facebook-capture-74-of-digital-ad-revenue/>

³³ For a review of the literature, see: Urban, M.C. and Johal, S. (2020). [Understanding the Future of Skills](#). Public Policy Forum, Future Skills Centre and Ryerson University Diversity Institute. <https://fsc-ccf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/UnderstandingTheFutureOfSkills-PPF-JAN2020-EN.pdf>

³⁴ See for example:

- Johal, S., Thirgood, J., (2016). Working Without a Net: Rethinking Canada's Social Policy in the New Age of Work. The Mowat Centre. https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/wp-content/uploads/publications/132_working_without_a_net.pdf
- Johal, S., Yalnizyan, A., (2018). Race to the Top: Developing an Inclusive Growth Agenda for Canada. The Mowat Centre. https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/wp-content/uploads/publications/164_race_to_the_top.pdf
- Mowat Centre. (2015). Renewing Canada's Social Architecture. Mowat Centre. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/renewing-canadas-social-architecture/>
- Wood, Donna. (2019). Employment Insurance: Next steps on the road to renewal. Atkinson Foundation. https://atkinsonfoundation.ca/site/uploads/2019/02/Atkinson_EI-Report_13019-FINAL.pdf
- Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare. (2019). A Prescription for Canada: Achieving Pharmacare for All. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/public-engagement/external-advisory-bodies/implementation-national-pharmacare/final-report.html>
- Kirby, M. and Keon, W.J. (2006). Out of the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada. https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/sites/default/files/out_of_the_shadows_at_last_-_full_0_0.pdf
- Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP). (2016). Income Inequality: The Canadian Story. IRPP: Volume V. <https://irpp.org/research/income-inequality-the-canadian-story/>

³⁵ Johal, S., Hartmann, E., (2019). Facilitating the future of work through a modernized EI System. Public Policy Forum. <https://ppforum.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PPF-Modernizing-EI-for-Future-of-Work-April-2019-EN.pdf>

³⁶ Statistics Canada. (2019). Survey on early learning and child care arrangements, 2019. Statistics Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/190410/dq190410a-eng.htm>

-
- ³⁷ Centre for Addition and Mental Health. (n.d.) Mental Illness and Addiction: Facts and Statistics. Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. <https://www.camh.ca/en/driving-change/the-crisis-is-real/mental-health-statistics>
- ³⁸ Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare. (2019). Chapter 3: Key challenges facing Canada's prescription drug system. Health Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/about-health-canada/public-engagement/external-advisory-bodies/implementation-national-pharmacare/final-report.html#3>
- ³⁹ Federation of Canadian Municipalities. (2019). Building better lives together: First 100 day of federal government: A municipal call to action. Federation of Canadian Municipalities. <https://data.fcm.ca/documents/resources/building-better-lives-together.pdf>
- ⁴⁰ Benefits Canada. (2016). 56% of Canadians over 50 don't have a retirement savings plans: survey. September 12, 2016. <https://www.benefitscanada.com/news/56-of-canadians-over-50-dont-have-a-retirement-savings-plan-survey-87362>
- ⁴¹ Policy Horizons Canada. (2016). The Changing Nature of Work. Government of Canada. <https://horizons.gc.ca/en/2016/06/01/the-changing-nature-of-work/>
- ⁴² O'Kane, Josh. (2020). [Floor scrubbing robots go where humans fear to tread](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-floor-scrubbing-robots-go-where-humans-fear-to-tread/). The Globe and Mail, April 27, 2020. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-floor-scrubbing-robots-go-where-humans-fear-to-tread/>
- ⁴³ Joshi, Mohit. (2020). Who will be the winners in a post-pandemic economy? World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/post-pandemic-economy-favour-fastest-movers/>
- ⁴⁴ Frey, Carl Benedikt. (2020). COVID-19 will only increase automation anxiety. Financial Times. April 21, 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/817228a2-82e1-11ea-b6e9-a94cfd1d9bf>
- ⁴⁵ Urban, M.C. and Johal, S. (2020). Understanding the Future of Skills. Public Policy Forum, Future Skills Centre and Ryerson University Diversity Institute. <https://fsc-ccf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/UnderstandingTheFutureOfSkills-PPF-JAN2020-EN.pdf>
- ⁴⁶ Vu, V. and Malli, N. (2020). Anything but Static: Risks of COVID-19 to workers in Canada. Brookfield Institute. <https://brookfieldinstitute.ca/commentary/anything-but-static-risks-of-covid-19-to-workers-in-canada/>
- ⁴⁷ Macdonald, David. (2020). Unemployment may hit 70 year high but new EI replacement will help. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. <http://behindthenumbers.ca/2020/03/26/unemployment-may-hit-70-year-high-but-new-ei-replacement-will-help/>
- ⁴⁸ Davis, Brent. (2020). OpenText announces global office closures, workforce reductions. The Record. <https://www.therecord.com/news-story/9966890-opentext-announces-global-office-closures-workforce-reductions/#.Xqte5qZeDOo.twitter>
- ⁴⁹ Fremson, Ruth. (2020). What Will Tomorrow's Workplace Bring? More Elbow Room. The New York Times. April 7, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/business/workplace-telecommuting-coronavirus.html>
- ⁵⁰ Oxford Internet Institute. (2020). The Online Labour Index. Oxford Internet Institute. <https://ilabour.oii.ox.ac.uk/online-labour-index/>
- ⁵¹ Queisser, M., Adema, W., and Clarke, C. (2020). COVID-19, employment and women in OECD countries. VOX - CEPR Policy Portal. <https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-employment-and-women-oecd-countries>
- ⁵² World Trade Organization. (2020). Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy. World Economic Forum. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm

-
- ⁵³ Seric, A. and Winkler, D. (2020). COVID-19 could spur automation and reverse globalisation – to some extent. VOX - CEPR Policy Portal. <https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-could-spur-automation-and-reverse-globalisation-some-extent>
- ⁵⁴ Rathke, S.K., and O’Connell, J.E. (2020). Global Supply Chains in the Wake of COVID-19 In Socially Critical Industries - Is it Time to Reshore? The National Law Review, April 30 2020. <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/global-supply-chains-wake-covid-19-socially-critical-industries-it-time-to-reshore>
- ⁵⁵ Posadzki, Alexandra. (2020). Canadian companies seek new ways to answer customers as international call centres close due to COVID-19. The Globe and Mail. April 3, 2020. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-companies-seek-new-ways-to-answer-customers-as-international/>
- ⁵⁶ David Smith. (2020). Trump announces 60-day ban on immigrants seeking permanent status in US. The Guardian. April 21, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/global/2020/apr/21/trump-us-immigration-ban-pause-green-cards>
- ⁵⁷ El-Assal, K. and Thevenot, S. (2020). [Coronavirus: While U.S. bans immigrants, Canada welcomes them](https://www.cicnews.com/2020/04/coronavirus-while-u-s-bans-immigrants-canada-welcomes-them-0414199.html#gs.6w35pa). Canadian Immigration Newsletter. April 22, 2020. <https://www.cicnews.com/2020/04/coronavirus-while-u-s-bans-immigrants-canada-welcomes-them-0414199.html#gs.6w35pa>
- ⁵⁸ Statistics Canada. [Labour Force Survey - April 2020](https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200508/dq200508a-eng.htm?HPA=1). Statistics Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200508/dq200508a-eng.htm?HPA=1>
- ⁵⁹ Garcia, Tonya. (2020). Amazon’s 175,000-worker hiring spree suggests strong first-quarter sales despite COVID-19, analysts say. MarketWatch, April 28, 2020. <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/amazons-175000-worker-hiring-sprees-suggests-strong-first-quarter-sales-despite-covid-19-analysts-say-2020-04-27>
- ⁶⁰ Phillips, Matt. Investors Bet Giant Companies Will Dominate After Crisis. The New York Times, April 28, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/coronavirus-stocks.html>
- ⁶¹ Thompson, Derek. (2020). The Pandemic Will Change American Retail Forever. The Atlantic. April 27, 2020. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/how-pandemic-will-change-face-retail/610738/>; <https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/10/21215953/amazon-fresh-walmart-grocery-delivery-coronavirus-retail-store-closures>
- ⁶² Del Rey, Jason. (2020). Amazon was already powerful. The coronavirus pandemic cleared the way to dominance. Vox. <https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/10/21215953/amazon-fresh-walmart-grocery-delivery-coronavirus-retail-store-closures>
- ⁶³ Phillips, M.. Investors Bet Giant Companies Will Dominate After Crisis. The New York Times. April 28, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/coronavirus-stocks.html>
- ⁶⁴ Wessel, David. (2018). Is Lack of Competition Strangling the U.S. Economy? Harvard Business Review. March/April 2018. <https://hbr.org/2018/03/is-lack-of-competition-strangling-the-u-s-economy>
- ⁶⁵ Brennan, Jordan. (2012). A Shrinking Universe: How concentrated corporate power is shaping income inequality in Canada. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/349/2/20121100_brennan_a_shrinking_universe.pdf
- ⁶⁶ Mosby, I. and Rotz, S. As meat plants shut down, COVID-19 reveals the extreme concentration of our food supply. The Globe and Mail. April 29, 2020. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-as-meat-plants-shut-down-covid-19-reveals-the-extreme-concentration/>

-
- ⁶⁷ European Commission. (2017). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/1_en_act_part1_v10_en.pdf
- ⁶⁸ Nadella, Satya. (2020). Crisis requires coordinated digital response. The Financial Times, April 30, 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/b645d2f8-89f9-11ea-a109-483c62d17528>
- ⁶⁹ Raghunath, Aditya. (2020). 3 Stocks That Are Beating the Coronavirus Bear Market. The Motley Fool. April 28, 2020. <https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/04/28/3-tech-stocks-beating-coronavirus-bear-market.aspx>
- ⁷⁰ Weil, D. (2011). Enforcing labour standards in fissured workplaces: The US experience. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 22(2), 33–54. <https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/career-services/David%20Weil%20Enforcing%20Labour%20Standards%20in%20Fissured%20Workplaces.pdf>
- ⁷¹ Naidu, S., Posner, E.A. and Weyl, E.G. (2018). Antitrust Remedies for Labour Market Power. University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 850. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3129221##
- ⁷² Corak, Miles. (2020). COVID-19 is not the great leveller, it's the great revealer. The Broadbent Institute. https://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/milescorak/covid_19_is_not_the_great_leveller_it_s_the_great_revealer
- ⁷³ Schirle, T., Milligan, K. and Skuterud, M. (2020). Digging One Level Deeper into March's Workforce Numbers. The C.D. Howe Institute. <https://www.cdhowe.org/intelligence-memos/schirle-milligan-skuterud-%E2%80%93-digging-one-level-deeper-march%E2%80%99s-workforce-numbers>
- ⁷⁴ Statistics Canada. (2020). Labour Force Survey - April 2020. Statistics Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200508/dq200508a-eng.htm?HPA=1>
- ⁷⁵ Yalnizyan, Armine. (2020). COVID-19's impact: not recession, but a completely different economics. The Toronto Star. April 9, 2020. <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2020/04/09/covid-19s-impact-not-recession-but-a-completely-different-economics.html>
- ⁷⁶ Oreopoulos, Phil. (2020). Graduating During the COVID-19 Recession. The C.D. Howe Institute. <https://www.cdhowe.org/intelligence-memos/phil-oreopoulos-%E2%80%93-graduating-during-covid-19-recession>
- ⁷⁷ Ahmed, F., Ahmed, N., Pissarides, C. and Stiglitz, J. (2020). Why inequality could spread COVID-19. The Lancet. [https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667\(20\)30085-2/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(20)30085-2/fulltext)
- ⁷⁸ Keung, Nicholas. (2020). Black, Latin American and South Asian Canadians face biggest financial problems caused by COVID-19, survey suggests. The Toronto Star, April 13, 2020. <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2020/04/13/black-latin-american-and-south-asian-canadians-face-biggest-financial-problems-caused-by-covid-19-survey-suggests.html>
- ⁷⁹ Gibillini, Nicole. (2020). IMF sees 6.2% drop in Canada's 2020 GDP amid 'Great Lockdown'. BNN Bloomberg. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/imf-sees-6-2-drop-in-canada-s-2020-gdp-amid-great-lockdown-1.1421246>
- ⁸⁰ Parliamentary Budget Officer. (2020). Scenario Analysis Update: COVID-19 Pandemic and Oil Price Shocks. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. <https://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/en/blog/news/RP-2021-005-S--scenario-analysis-update-covid-19-pandemic-oil-price-shocks--mise-jour-analyse-scenario-chocs-dus-pandemie-covid-19-chute-prix-petrole>
- ⁸¹ Ibid.
- ⁸² Di Matteo, Livio. (2017). A Federal Fiscal History: 1867-2017. The Fraser Institute. <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/federal-fiscal-history-canada-1867-2017.pdf>

⁸³ Advisory Council on Economic Growth. (2017). The Path to Prosperity: Resetting Canada's Growth Trajectory. Government of Canada. <https://www.budget.gc.ca/aceg-ccce/pdf/pathway-to-prosperity-eng.pdf>

⁸⁴ RBC Economics. (2020). Pandemic to Spill Red Ink All over Provinces' Books. RBC Thought Leadership.

https://thoughtleadership.rbc.com/pandemic-to-spill-red-ink-all-over-provinces-books/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=salesforce&utm_campaign=provincial+april

⁸⁵ Bula, F., Moore, O., and Van Praet, N. (2020). Cities face massive financial shortfalls because of COVID. How can they cope when they can't run deficits? The Globe and Mail. April 13, 2020.

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-cities-face-massive-financial-shortfalls-because-of-covid-how-can/>

⁸⁶ Laurin, A., Mahaboubi, P., and Robson, W. (2020). To reopen the economy, put curbs on the CERB. Financial Post, April 29, 2020. <https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/to-reopen-the-economy-put-curbs-on-the-cerb> ;

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-how-is-ottawa-going-to-pay-off-its-covid-19-debt-with-any-luck-it/> ;

<https://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/columnists/lawrie-mcfarlane-economic-damage-from-virus-fight-likely-to-extend-well-into-future-1.24120454>

⁸⁷ The Globe and Mail Editorial. (2020). How is Ottawa going to pay off its COVID-19 debt? With any luck it won't have to. The Globe and Mail, April 27, 2020. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-how-is-ottawa-going-to-pay-off-its-covid-19-debt-with-any-luck-it/>

⁸⁸ McFarlane, Lawrie. (2020). Economic damage from virus fight likely to extend well into future. Times Colonist, April 19, 2020. <https://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/columnists/lawrie-mcfarlane-economic-damage-from-virus-fight-likely-to-extend-well-into-future-1.24120454>

⁸⁹ Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy. (2017). Community Benefits Agreements: Empowering Communities To Maximize Returns on Public Infrastructure Investments. University of Ottawa.

<http://www.ifsd.ca/web/default/files/Presentations/Reports/17011%20-%20Community%20Benefits%20Agreements%20-%202017%20July%202017.pdf>

⁹⁰ May, Bryan. (2019). Labour Shortages and Solutions in the GTHA Construction Industry. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities.

<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/HUMA/Reports/RP10492157/humarp17/humarp17-e.pdf>

⁹¹ Fortin, N.M., & Lemieux, T. (2015). Changes in wage inequality in Canada: An interprovincial perspective. Canadian Journal of Economics, 48(2), 682–713. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/caje.12140>

⁹² For a fuller discussion of minimum wage issue and approach in other jurisdictions see:

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2019). Report of the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/expert-panel-final.html>

⁹³ Employment and Social Development Canada. (2019). Report of the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/expert-panel-final.html>

⁹⁴ Campolieti, M., Gomez, R., & Gunderson, M. (2011). What accounts for the representation gap? Decomposing Canada-US differences in the desire for collective voice. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 53(4), 425–449.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022185611409111>

⁹⁵ Gomez, R. (2016). Employee voice and representation in the world of work: Issues and options for Ontario.

Changing Workplaces Review 2015.

<https://cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/sites/cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/files/research-projects/Gomez-8-Voice%20.pdf>

⁹⁶ For further discussion of these issues see:

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2019). Report of the Expert Panel on Modern Federal Labour Standards. Government of Canada.

<https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/labour-standards/reports/expert-panel-final.html>

⁹⁷ Johal, S. and Yalnizyan, A. (2018). Race to the Top: Developing an Inclusive Growth Agenda for Canada. Mowat Centre. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/race-to-the-top/>

⁹⁸ Press, Jordan. (2020). Aging government computer systems at risk of ‘critical failure’, Trudeau warned. The Canadian Press via CBC News.

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-it-systems-critical-failure-1.5448871>

⁹⁹ Office of the Auditor General of Canada. (2010). Chapter 1 – Aging Information Technology Systems. 2010 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada.

https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201004_01_e_33714.html#hd3a

¹⁰⁰ Roman, Karina. (2020). EI claimants are going weeks without income as federal call system slows to a crawl. CBC Politics.

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/employment-insurance-ei-cerb-covid-coronavirus-pandemic-1.5549617>

¹⁰¹ Apolitical. (2018). Mapped: the world’s best digital governments. Apolitical analysis / data digital and tech.

https://apolitical.co/en/solution_article/mapped-the-worlds-best-digital-governments

¹⁰² Gouterman, V. and Kuo, L. (2020). For all the benefit from digital infrastructure, Canada must balance affordability of mobile phone bills with network quality, investment and innovation.

<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2020/future-proofing-canadas-digital-infrastructure/>

¹⁰³ Cribb, J. and Emmerson, C. (2016). What happens when employers are obliged to nudge? Automatic enrolment and pension saving in the UK. IFS Working Paper W16/19. Economic and Social Research Council.

<https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/wp1619.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ Gold, J. and Mendelsohn, M. (2014). Better Outcomes for Public Services: Achieving social impact through outcomes-based funding. Mowat Centre.

<https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/better-outcomes-for-public-services/>

¹⁰⁵ KPMG International. (2013). The Integration Imperative: Reshaping the delivery of human and social services. KPMG and the Mowat Centre.

<https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/nz/pdf/October/integration-imperative-kpmg-nz.pdf>

¹⁰⁶ Policy Horizons Canada. (n.d.) Module 1: Introduction to Foresight. Government of Canada.

<https://horizons.gc.ca/en/our-work/learning-materials/foresight-training-manual-module-1-introduction-to-foresight/>

¹⁰⁷ Apolitical. (n.d.) Mapped: The innovation labs transforming government – and how to get in touch. Apolitical.

<https://apolitical.co/government-innovation-lab-directory/>

-
- ¹⁰⁸ Barber, M., Kihn, P. and Moffit, A. (2011). Deliverology: From idea to implementation. McKinsey and Company. <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/deliverology-from-idea-to-implementation>
- ¹⁰⁹ Maxwell, J. and Saunders R. (2007). Adjusting to freer trade: two policy failures. Policy Options <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/ontario-2007-dalton-mcquinty/adjusting-to-freer-trade-two-policy-failures/>
- ¹¹⁰ Munro, D. (2014). Employers must start investing in skills training or risk having public policy nudge them along. Financial Post. - <https://business.financialpost.com/executive/employers-must-start-investing-in-skills-training-or-risk-having-public-policy-nudge-them-along>
- ¹¹¹ Johal, S. and Hartmann, E. (2019). Facilitating the future of work through a modernized EI system. Public Policy Forum. <https://ppforum.ca/publications/facilitating-the-future-of-work-through-a-modernized-ei-system/>
- ¹¹² Johal, Sunil. (2018). GM's closing is a warning shot: Canada's not ready for the age of disruption. The Globe and Mail Opinion. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-gms-closing-is-a-warning-shot-canadas-not-ready-for-the-age-of/>
- ¹¹³ See for example:
- Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. (2020). Flexicurity. Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. <https://star.dk/en/about-the-danish-agency-for-labour-market-and-recruitment/flexicurity/>
 - Hendeliowitz, Jan. (2008). Danish Employment Policy: National Target Setting, Regional Performance Management and Local Delivery. <https://www.oecd.org/employment/leed/40575308.pdf>
 - ¹¹³ Bredgaard, T., Larsen, F., Madsen, P.K. (2005). The flexible Danish labour market – a review. CARMA, Aalborg University. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a2c0/2ce20b5cb3790ca9d13fbb1c0fba94327329.pdf>
- ¹¹⁴ OECD. (2020). Public spending on labour markets (indicator). OECD. doi: 10.1787/911b8753-en
- ¹¹⁵ Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. (2019). Evidence-based policy-making. Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. <https://www.star.dk/en/evidence-based-policy-making/>
- ¹¹⁶ Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. (2018). Performance management in the Danish employment system. Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment. <https://star.dk/en/about-the-danish-agency-for-labour-market-and-recruitment/performance-management-in-the-danish-employment-system/>
- ¹¹⁷ Canadian Apprenticeship Forum. (2019). Apprentice Demand in the Top Ten Red Seal Trades: A 2019 National Labour Market Information Report. Canadian Apprenticeship Forum. <https://caf-fca.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019-National-LMI-Report.pdf>
- ¹¹⁸ Government of Colorado, Careerwise Colorado, Colorado Workforce Development Council, and Colorado Department of Labor and Employment. (n.d.) Colorado's Swiss Apprenticeship Model. Government of Colorado. https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CO_Swiss_Apprenticeship_Model.pdf
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹²⁰ Lake, R. and Gross, B. (2018) Lake and Gross: From Switzerland by Way of Colorado, a New Approach to Apprenticeships that Rethinks the Path from High School to College to Career. The 74 Million. <https://www.the74million.org/article/lake-gross-from-switzerland-by-way-of-colorado-a-new-approach-to-apprenticeships-that-rethinks-the-path-from-high-school-to-college-to-career/>
- ¹²¹ Singmaster, Heather. (n.d.) An Apprenticeship Model from Switzerland. Asia Society. <https://asiasociety.org/global-cities-education-network/apprenticeship-model-switzerland>

¹²² Hoffman, N. and Schwartz, R. (2015). Gold Standard: The Swiss Vocational Education and Training System. National Centre on Education and the Economy. <http://ncee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SWISSVETMarch11.pdf>

¹²³ Apprenticeship Toolbox. (2019). Apprenticeship System in Switzerland. Apprenticeship Toolbox. <https://www.apprenticeship-toolbox.eu/switzerland/apprenticeship-system-in-switzerland/157-apprenticeship-system-in-switzerland>

¹²⁴ OECD. (2019). Youth unemployment rate. OECD. <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart>

¹²⁵ Manpower Group. (n.d.) Hire, train, deploy: Skilling up. Manpower Group. <https://doingwellbydoinggood.manpowergroup.com/skilling-up/hire-train-deploy/>

¹²⁶ SkillsFuture. (2020). About SkillsFuture. SkillsFuture. <https://www.skillsfuture.sg/AboutSkillsFuture#section2>

¹²⁷ Future Work Awards. (2019). A bias free up-skilling program that uses AI to analyse whether candidates are good potential tech hires based on skills rather than pedigrees. Future Work Awards. <https://www.thersa.org/action-and-research/rsa-projects/economy-enterprise-manufacturing-folder/future-work-awards/winners/catalyte>

¹²⁸ Cullen, Terri. (2019). Amazon plans to spend \$700 million to retrain a third of its US workforce in new skills. CNBC. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/amazon-plans-to-spend-700-million-to-retrain-a-third-of-its-workforce-in-new-skills-wsj.html>

¹²⁹ Mautz, Scott. (2019). Amazon Just Announced It Is Spending \$700 Million to Retrain 100,000 Employees (and They're Free to Quit Thereafter). Inc. <https://www.inc.com/scott-mautz/amazon-just-announced-theyre-spending-700-million-to-retrain-100000-employees-and-theyre-free-to-quit-thereafter.html>

¹³⁰ See for example:

- Mowat Centre. (n.d.) Mowat Centre EI Task Force Mowat Centre. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/ei-task-force/>
- Mowat Centre. (2017). The Seventy-Five Year Decline. Mowat Centre. <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/mowatcentre/the-seventy-five-year-decline/>
- Sunil, Johal. (2019). Facilitating the Future of Work Through a Modernized EI System. Public Policy Forum. <https://ppforum.ca/publications/facilitating-the-future-of-work-through-a-modernized-ei-system/>

¹³¹ Employment and Social Development Canada. (2017). Employment Insurance Monitoring and Assessment Report for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2017 and ending March 31, 2018. Employment and Social Development Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/ei/ei-list/reports/monitoring2018/chapter2/regular-benefits.html>

¹³² Macdonald, David. (2020). COVID-19 and the Canadian workforce. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/2020/03/CCPA%20Report_COVID19%20and%20the%20Canadian%20Workforce.pdf

¹³³ For more details on these issues: Sunil, Johal and Erich Hartmann. (2019). Facilitating the Future of Work Through a Modernized EI System. Public Policy Forum. <https://ppforum.ca/publications/facilitating-the-future-of-work-through-a-modernized-ei-system/>

¹³⁴ Léonard, André. (2014). Employment Insurance Financing Background Paper. House of Commons, Parliament of Canada. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201489E

